Wolfgang Köhler on facts and values
In this essay I investigate some of Köhler's philosophical ideas. Köhler competently discusses the problem of facts and values, which is still urgent nowadays.
To this purpose, he expresses his views concerning the nature of phenomenological data, the way mental and brain processes are related and the structure of physical reality. Although his philosophical reflexions mainly ensue from his epistemological turn, consisting in the adoption of the Gestalt's point of view in psychology, in The Place of Value in a World of Facts and in other works Köhler goes far beyond Gestalt psychology and develops a consistent and partly autonomous epistemology. In his view, true science cannot allow for the contradiction arising between the complete absence of value-related entities in the physical world and the obvious valuerelatedness of many, or most, human behaviors. Positivism and behaviorism tried to overcome this gap, arguing for the actual absence of values within both the scientific and human world: human beings, as outcomes of evolution, can be wholly explained as the mere result of ordinary physical laws. Yet, positivists manifestly contradict themselves insofar as they consider factual science as their supreme value. As a reaction to this point of view, Köhler notes, spiritualism argue for the existence of a spiritual principle, and vitalism claims that the laws governing the world of living beings cannot ever be reduced to those of inorganic nature.
Köhler is unsatisfied with all of these views. His arguments have nothing to do with a plea for the intrinsic value of humanity according to spiritualistic, vitalistic (or extra-scientific, e.g. religious) stances. Rather, Köhler insists on the logical inconsistency of spiritualistic attempts and seeks for a different solution within the framework of what he calls "epistemological dualism". As we shall see, Köhler aims at a new interpretation of physical facts and laws that should include (or, at least, should not clash with) the principle of "requiredness" as a basis for a value theory. Köhler is consciously far from developing a wholly detailed theory of value. Nevertheless, the strategy underlying his arguments is quite clear and offers an interesting contribution, enabling epistemology to bridge the increasing gap between natural and human sciences.
My analysis of this theme is organized as follows: in the first place, I present Köhler's intellectual path towards the definition of his philosophical ideas and draw special attention to his concept of "physical Gestalt" (2). Secondly, I illustrate his philosophy of science and his thought in the field of phenomenology, compared to Carl Stumpf's ideas on those matters (3). Finally, I discuss Köhler's solution to the problem of value within the general framework of his "epistemological dualism"(4). An interesting chapter in Köhler's career is represented by his relationship with Stumpf. Stumpf, who had studied under Franz Brentano and had later deeply modified his teacher's views, had devoted himself both to philosophy and to experimental research, contributing to overcome associationism and positivism in psychology and developing some historical antecedent (e.g. "tonal fusion") of the concept of Gestalt.
Born in Estonia in
Moreover, Stumpf recommended a sound scientific training to all those who were interested in philosophical issues, and advocated cooperation between natural Köhler 1917. 3 Ash 1995, 170; 207. 4 On the circumstances surrounding this invitation see Sokal 1984 Sokal , 1251 and the related hypothesis of constancy between stimulus and sensation . But then, 9 Stumpf was a relatively liberal teacher, who never aimed at establishing a "school" and sincerely appreciated his students' originality . Despite Köhler's criticism -and, on the Maxwell's field theory. Indeed, forces or electric charges within an electromagnetic field show properties that exceed the mere sum of the involved items. As Köhler puts it, they tend to assume time-independent states, with a minimum energy dissipation and maximum entropy. The opponents of Gestalt psychology, who assume that any complex phenomena result from elementary elements and association processes, are thus mistaken when they claim they comply to the methods of physics. Against them, Stumpf 1907 physiologists for its lack of empirical evidence. Köhler always replied to his critics that isomorphism was a working hypothesis, allowing us to explain a certain set of facts concerning perception. Be that as it may, these theses also brought about a debate as Köhler 1920, xv. 12 Köhler 1920, 68 . In the first, introductory chapter ("The case against science") Köhler stages a dialogue between a skeptical editor of a magazine's special issue about the Krise der Wissenschaft ("crisis of science") and himself. Unsurprisingly, in the dialogue Köhler For the realistic interpretation see Ash 1995, 177 ff. esp. 186. By contrast, Keiler 1980 16 champions the "idealist" party. For a discussion and in favor of a monistic solution, see Toccafondi 2000 , 85-97. Let us for the moment give the name value to this common trait of intrinsic requiredness or wrongness, and let us call insight all awareness of such intellectual, moral or aesthetic value. We can then say that value and corresponding insight constitute the very essence of human mental life. Take any major human problem, and you will find that it contains this factor . 20 In the course of his analysis, Köhler privileges the rather technical term "requiredness" over "value". As far as the readability of his book is concerned, this choice is questionable; however, Köhler correctly remarks that "requiredness" applies both to logical necessity and to values in the narrower, i.e. ethical and aesthetic
The Berlin Gestaltists' compliance to scientific methods, and their adherence to science 18 as an ideal form of knowledge, should be stressed against any misinterpretation of the "Gestalt movement" in terms of a kind of holistic mysticism. Together with Lewin, Köhler had cooperated with Hans Reichenbach and planned to start a journal for exact science. See Ash 1995, 261; Milkov, 2011 , x, xiv, Milkov 2013 , 9-10. The Gestaltists' relationship to the Vienna Circle should also be adequately appreciated. See Kluck 2008, 48 and passim. Köhler 1938, 17. 19 Köhler 1938, 31 . Phenomenally, the bodily 'self' is not a physical entity outside immediate experience as is the physical organism; it is, rather, a percept of which we are aware, enriched by changing moods, attitudes, efforts and activities. Similarly, 'objects' in this discipline are phenomenal things, for instance percepts. (Images, concepts, and the like, are also called 'objects' and not without justification.) Percepts are, of course, not ghosts belonging somehow to the phenomenal 'self.' Those, at least, which we call 'things' look, in general, most 'real', 'independent', 'permanent' and 'substantial'; they often feel 'heavy' and as a rule 'resistant'. All this implies in no sense a contradiction of their nature as phenomenal things. Their place is not in the 'self' -why should these percepts be localized inside another particular percept?-, but in other parts of phenomenal 'space', near or far as the case may be. In this world which is that of naive everyday life, certain parts, events and properties belong phenomenally to the 'self' others belong to 'objects' or, more generally speaking, to the phenomenal environment of the 'self'. The former have the character of 'subjectivity' which, in this sense, is only another name for the fact that they appear and are counted as parts or states of the 'self'; the latter have, in most cases, the character of 'objectivity'.' 26 Köhler clearly distinguishes two aspects within phenomenal experience: subjectivity and objectivity. Phenomenal data have a subjective aspect (the 'self') and an objective aspect ('things'). Probably, Köhler goes on, the subdivision in a subjective and an objective area within human consciousness is progressively acquired, or learned in the course of individual development. At the same time, and without any contradiction, both subjective and objective phenomenal data are "genetically subjective", that is, they belong to the experience of a certain human subject and, as such, depend on the individual's central nervous system. Thus, Köhler makes a point of Köhler 1938, 68 . Köhler rejects the tendency of some other phenomenologists towards 25 mysticism and obscure philosophizing (possibly an allusion to Martin Heidegger). Köhler 1938, 68. 26 carefully avoiding any confusion between the phenomenal 'self' and the organic body.
The former is part of experience, the latter never appears within it.
Before discussing this theory in the next chapter, let us make a historical digression concerning, once more, Stumpf's influence. For Stumpf as well, there is no "pure" phenomenological investigation. Rather, phenomenology should focus on "regional" research concerning ordinary experience, and especially perceptual issues . Stumpf 1906 Stumpf 1918, 81. 30 clearly resembles the field theory in physics. In fact, vectors represent forces defined in a certain field, which is, in this case, the phenomenal field. To explain that, Köhler first reminds his reader of the general postulates of the Gestalt theory:
In Gestalt psychology we distinguish three major traits which are conspicuous in all cases of specific organization or gestalt. Phenomenally the world is neither an indifferent mosaic nor an indifferent continuum. It exhibits definite segregated units or contexts in all degrees of complexity, articulation and clearness. Secondly such units show properties belonging to them as contexts or systems. Again the parts of such units or contexts exhibit dependent properties in the sense that, given the place of a part in the context, its dependent properties are determined by this position . 31 In order to exemplify the situation, Köhler goes on, let us suppose that a melody in a certain key, e.g. of a-minor, is played on a piano. The resulting chord of this melody, in most cases, will be an a-minor chord. In this case, the a-minor chord is perceived as the "right" chord, while any other chord would break in as a "wrong" one.
The requiredness of the a-minor chord, Köhler concludes, is completely objective. It does not depend on a subjective preference. Obviously enough, the melody and the chord are made up of single tones. But the "tertiary quality" represented by its key of aminor dissolves if those tones are presented separately . Therefore, Köhler notes:
32
[w]e can analyze the melody, but not in independent parts. That would be destruction of the melody. Its minor-character for instance would be lost. We can analyze the situation of subjective requiredness, but […] not in independent parts, all taken by themselves. The vector -and requiredness -cannot exist alone any more than a fish can live out of water . 33 In some cases, the vector originates from another human subject. For instance, the police officer who makes me stop at the crossing, a beggar who holds out his hand towards me. This fact, Köhler believes, does not make any significant exception to the objective explanation of requiredness. Rather, one should distinguish two cases: "in the Köhler 1938, 84-85. 31 Tertiary qualities correspond to the power of sorting selected effects upon other things 32 or persons. They are even more response-dependent than secondary ones. For instance, the color of a rose is a secondary quality, but its beauty is a tertiary quality. Similarly, in Köhler's example, the sounds are secondary qualities, whereas the a-minor key is a tertiary one. Köhler 1938, 85. 33 first, the vector points toward the object, in the other the object is the point of origin of the vector" . 34 So far, requiredness has been explained from a phenomenological point of view.
Yet, Köhler is far from reaching his final goal. Phenomenology is "the field in which all concepts" -including requiredness -"find their final justification". But then those concepts can and must be applied to extra-phenomenal fields, too . Consequently, 35 Köhler needs to extend the analysis of requiredness "beyond phenomenology", as the title of the next chapter reads. For the sake of the present concern, I shall distinguish three main steps within Köhler's way beyond phenomenology: (1) the experience of transcendence, (2) the pseudoproblem of realism, and (3) the postulate of isomorphism.
(1) Firstly, Köhler reflects upon the possibility of experiencing transcendence.
With this, he does not think of a mystic or religious experience of "transcendent" divine entities. Rather, he draws attention to some liminal case, in which conscious experience seems to require, or imply, an extra-phenomenal world which transcends consciousness itself. In this fascinating analysis, Köhler always takes for granted that there is something beyond phenomenology: a physiological support for consciousness, consisting in the central nervous system. This system never manifests itself phenomenally. We know about it only indirectly, that is, via a series of scientific inferences concerning the biological basis of life and consciousness. Nevertheless, Köhler argues, some experiences let us guess its presence. Since experience does not consist of atomic facts, but rather of oriented vectors, nothing prevents us from thinking of a vector pointing from inside experience outwards, or vice versa. As an example, Köhler refers to memory. It is commonly experienced that sometimes we repeatedly 36 fail to recall a certain name although, at the same time, we feel close to remembering it. In Köhler's words: Köhler 1938 , 93-94. This topic is discussed separately in a whole chapter of the book (VII).
36
I wish to remember the new painter's name which I heard yesterday during a conversation. "Just a moment," I say to myself, "I know that I know it; I shall get it at once." Everybody has such experiences. Before a name or another fact is actually remembered there may be a difficulty, a suspense, a delay in its appearance. Nevertheless we may know at the same time that "it is there"; we feel referred, and even referred to the right thing, even though this same thing has not yet emerged into phenomenal existence. 37 Significantly, here Köhler pays a tribute to William James, who discussed this experience in his Principles of Psychology. As James put it, in this case there is an 38 "intesively active" gap in our consciousness. "If wrong names are proposed to us, this singularly definite gap acts immediately so as to negate them. They do not fit into its mould" . According to Köhler's explanation, the painter's name actually lies outside 39 consciousness and, from "there", directs consciousness towards the right solution.
When we are presented with wrong names, we are so to speak told "from outside" that the correct solution is still to come. In this case, Köhler believes, one actually experiences transcendence. Within phenomenology, consciousness feels its own incompleteness and claims for completion: the complement, however, clearly resides outside consciousness.
The distinctive trait of transcendence as we observed it, was direct coherence of function, of reference, between an incomplete phenomenal context and a transphenomenal entity. There is only one part of nature which, according to present knowledge, could in this case be so intimately in contact with phenomenal data. This part of nature is the circumscribed world of brain-events. Our conclusion will therefore be that, in trying to remember something and knowing that we know it, our reference is from the point of view of science reference to a definite neurological, or better: neural entity, an entity which would commonly and perhaps clumsily be called a memorytrace. 40 (2) Secondly, Köhler discusses another form of transcendence -namely, the external world beyond our central nervous system. Whereas the formerly discussed argument contrasts with phenomenalism, Köhler now challenges realism. Against both Köhler 1938, 117. 37 Köhler 1938, 119. 38 James 1896, I, 251. 39 Köhler 1938, 123 . According to Köhler, the parts of our body belong to the objective part of phenomenal experience, no less than any other inanimate object around us. Now, the above mentioned pseudoproblem originates from a systematic lack of distinction between phenomenal and "transphenomenal" objects. Whenever we say that "percepts depend on processes inside the organism", the organism is a "physical object", whose properties are investigated, for instance, by an anatomist. This object, as such, never recurs within the individual's immediate experience. By contrast, whenever we say that "thing-percepts are located outside myself", the word "myself" refers to something "of which I am aware in the bright daylight of direct phenomenal experience". 42 Accordingly, "when thing-percepts and other phenomena are said to be genetically subjective, to depend upon processes inside the organism, the term 'inside' refers to a physical, a transphenomenal fact"; by contrast, "when thing-percepts are said to be located 'outside myself' the term 'outside' must refer to a strictly phenomenal fact: In Köhler 1938, 127 . See also 1929, 224-233 (an analysis that Köhler later considered 41 unsatisfactory) and 1929. Köhler 1938, 129 . On the basis of the three above listed arguments, Köhler concludes by endorsing epistemological dualism, which he defines as follows:
Epistemological Dualism holds that percepts cannot be identified with physical objects, because percepts emerge only after many events have happened between the objects and the organism, in peripheral parts of the organism and eventually in the brain. This view seems to lead to a paradox since, as a rule, thing-percepts appear outside our body. We have first shown that this argument is due to an ambiguity of terms. Then, in a discussion of neurological data, we have found that on this ground localization of thing-percepts 'inside ourselves' could never be expected. Much discussion between the New Realists and their opponents would probably have been Köhler 1938, 130. 43 "On Isomorphism": Köhler 1938, 185-232. 44 "On Memory and on Transcendence", "A Discussion of Organic Fitness": Köhler 1938, 45 233-278; 279-328. avoided if more attention had been given to these sections of psychology and neurology. 46 In accordance with this evidence, the question as to whether Köhler should be considered a realist or an idealist in philosophy can be reconsidered. In fact, Köhler was neither realist nor idealist. He opposed naive realism, claiming that human perception has no direct grasp of worldly things. Yet he escaped the cage of idealism and firmly believed that a world of things does exist, and that consciousness as a whole depends on one of these things, i.e., the nervous system. One should bear in On the basis of epistemological dualism, in fact, Köhler is eventually able to solve the problem of value. Relatedness has no subjective origin -or, at least, not necessarily. Vectors can originate both within the objective and within the subjective side of our phenomenal experience; moreover, they can originate outside experience (in what he calls the "transphenomenal" field) and terminate within it. In sum, requiredness has four main characteristics:
First: A datum, an entity or an act is required within a context of other data, entities or acts. [...] Secondly: Within the context in question requiredness is a dependent characteristic that has no existence of its own, apart from the entities that fit or do not fit each other in these contexts.
Thirdly: All requiredness transcends from certain parts of a context to others of the same context. Like all other kinds of reference, it is in this sense a directed Köhler 1938, 141. 46 As we have seen, in this revival of epistemological dualism Köhler probably relied upon 47 Stumpf. Yet Stumpf claimed that the existence of the external world is a hypothetical construct. translocal trait, a vector, that cannot be split into bits which have a merely local existence. […] Fourthly: Requiredness differs strikingly from other forms of reference by its demanding character. It involves acceptance or rejection of the present status of the context in question, often more particularly, acceptance or rejection of some part by the remainder of the context. This demanding character has degrees of intensity. The lower this intensity, the more will a condition of merely factual relation, juxtaposition or sequence be realized. 48 Köhler points out the formal similarity between these four characteristics and the defining characters of a physical force. Forces are also defined within contexts (fields), they do not exist apart from it, they transcend from a part to another part of the given context, and they also contribute to establish a certain context, or resist to it, with different degrees of intensity. Therefore, there are no grounds for a gap between a justification for an outright dismissal of any attempt of explanation in the field of human values as unscientific. In Köhler's opinion, the price to be payed for this extraordinary extension of the scientific world view is quite modest: a slight revision of some concepts of physics or, more precisely: a perhaps unusual but entirely consistent way of looking at them. Köhler 1938, 336-337. 48 Köhler 1938, 342. 49 See also Köhler 1950 . 50 Köhler 1938, 373. 51 
